ΕΥΣΧΗΜΟΝΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΞΙΝ:

OR,

THE GROUNDS OF UNIFORMITY

From 1 *Cor.* 14. 40.

Vindicated from Mr JEANES's *exceptions* to *One* passage in the *View* of the DIRECTORY.

By *H. Hammond* D. D.

LONDON,
Printed by *J. G.* for *Richard Royston*, at the Angel in *Ivy*-Lane, *M. DC. LVII.*

XUM

THE GROUND OF UNIFORMITY

By H. Bennet D.D.

LONDON,
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in Ivy Lane, M. DC. LVII.

1 Cor. 14. 40.

Εὐχημόνως, καὶ κατὰ τάξιν.

Decently, and according to appointment.

1. SInce the publiſhing that *Anſwer* to Mr *J.* concerning the *degrees of ardency in Chriſt's prayer*, I am advertiſed of *another* paſſage in that *volume*, in which I am concern'd, relating to ſome words of mine in the *view* of the *Directory* pag. 19. on the head of *Uniformity* in *Gods ſervice*, and particularly reſpecting my *rendring* of the *Apoſtle* 1 Cor. 14. 40. *Let all things be done* εὐχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν.

2. Theſe indeed I thus rendred [*decently, and according to order, or appointment*] and affirmed the importance of that place to be, that all be done in the *Church according to cuſtome*, and *appointment*, rendring this *reaſon* of the *former*, *becauſe it was implied* in εὐχημόνως *decently* (*cuſtome being the onely rule of decency* &c.) and of the *latter*, becauſe the *words* do *literally* import this, κατὰ τάξιν, *i. e. according to order or appointment.*

3. To the former of theſe he makes his *firſt exception*, thus, [*He dares not affirm that this is the immediate ſenſe of the place, but onely that it is implied; It cannot be denied but that decency doth imply ſuch cuſtomes, the omiſſion of which neceſſarily infer*

indecency, but that the omission of such ceremonies as ours, doth infer undecency, the Doctor & all his party can never make good. What undecency can the Doctor prove to be in the administration of Baptisme without the Crosse, as also in publick prayers and preaching without a Surplice? But of this see further in Ames *in the places but now quoted. The Doctor may perhaps look upon him as an inconsiderable adversary. But we shall think his Arguments considerable, until the Doctor, or some other of his party give a satisfactory answer unto them. In the mean while let us examine the proof that the Doctor brings for this sense: and it is, because custome is the onely rule of decency.*

This proposition, though very strange, is prooflesse; and therefore we might as well reject it, as the Doctor dictates it. But I shall add a confutation of it from these following arguments.

1. *If custome be the onely rule of decency, then nothing else can be a rule thereof besides custome; but this is false, for the light and law of nature, is also a rule thereof, and that infallible.*

2. *Nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto the onely rule of decency. But divers things are undecent, which yet can plead custome: and this is so evident, as that I will not so much undervalue the Doctors judgment as to endeavour any proofs thereof. It is impossible that the onely rule of decency should be undecent: But yet it is very possible that many customes should be undecent, and therefore I shall conclude that custome is not the onely rule of decency.*

3. *Lastly, unto custome, as you may see in both* Aristotle *and* Aquinas, *the frequent usage of a thing is required. But now there may be decency or handsomeness in the first usage of a thing; and of this decency custome is not the rule, and therefore it is not the onely rule of decency.*

4. The *first* thing here charged on me is *timidity*, that *I dare not say*, what I said not, and this attended with a *concession* (in a limited sense) of the *truth* of what I did say; the *second*, is the *impertinence*, or *unsufficiency* of that, in that *limited* sense, to *prove* what he conceives I would *have* from it, *viz.* that *the omission of our ceremonies doth infer indecency*; And the *proof* of this charge *twofold*, 1. by way of *question*, founded in *two* instances, the *Crosse* in *Baptisme*, and the *Surplice* in *publick pray-*

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or and preaching. 2. by *reference* to *Ames*, and resolving to think his *arguments considerable*, till a *satisfactory answer* be given them. And his *third charge* is, my using an *insufficient proof* to prove my *interpretation*, *viz.* this *because custome is the only rule of decency*] which he *confutes* by three *arguments*.

5. These *three charges* I shall now very briefly *examine*, and if I mistake not, clearly *evacuate*. The *first* by assuring him, 1. that I did *dare* to say, and indeed *said* (as I then thought, *perspicuously*) the full of what I *meant*, but that it was no way incumbent on me, to *say* either what I did not *mean*, or what Mr J. or any other should be justly able to *charge* of want of *truth* in the least degree. And 2. if what I said cannot, as he confesses, be *denied*, to have *truth* in it in *one* sense, I demand why must it be a not *daring* (which is wont to signifie *timidity*, or *cowardice*) that I affirmed it not in *another* sense, wherein he doth not *consent* to it?

6. To make short, and prevent all *possibility* of his, or any mans farther *mistaking* my words, I shall hasten to tell him the full of my *meaning* in that passage, that [*ἐυσχημόνως decently*] implies [*according to customs*] *viz.* that in such things as these, of which then I spake, *gestures*, *habites* and the *like circumstances* of *Gods publick service*, wherein the *Apostle* prescribes care of decency, 'tis necessary to observe the *customes* of the place wherein we live: This I then thought sufficiently explicated by *exemplifying* in mens *wearing long hair*, which the *Apostle* proved *indecent* by its being *against custome*, i. e. saith *Suidas*, χρονία συνήθεια, a *customs* of some *continuance* in that place (which yet in *women* there, and in *men* in *other* places, where that *custome* prevail'd not, had nothing *indecent* in it.)

7. But this *exemplification* of my meaning he thought fit to *conceal* from the Reader, and supply that *vacuity* onely with an &c. yet reciting at *length*, to a word, what was *immediately* before, and after it. His design in so doing I *judge* not, but shall endeavour to undeceive the *Reader* for the future, by farther inlarging on it.

8. All people, I think, in the world have some *outward* significations, and *expressions* of *Reverence*, but all have not the *same*.

same, but according to *Topical customes* some *different*, some *contrary* to others. We of this, and all our neighbour Nations expresse *reverence* by *uncovering the head*, the *Turkes* do the *contrary*. Again among *Christians*, 'tis *customary* for men *so* to expresse their *Reverence*, but for *women*, saith the *Apostle*, it is not, but the *contrary*; and so still it is among *us*. Nay it was once among some *Heathens* (that worshipt *Mercury*) an act of the *highest* reverence, even of *adoration*, to *throw stones* at their *God*, among others to *cut themselves with lancets*, when they were a praying to him. And it can be no news to Mr *F.* that these *customes* were not observed by *other* countreys; the *Jews* that *threw stones* at *Christ*, and the *Demoniack* that *cut himself* with them, were neither of them *interpretable* to worship him.

9. This therefore was no *dark*, but *visible* foundation of what I said; In assigning any *rite* or *ceremony* for the *service* of *God*, *decency*, saith the *Apostle*, was to be observed, the onely *rule* to judge of that, is, say I, to consider the *customes* of that *particular* place, of which we consult. Where *bowing* the *knee*, or *kneeling* on the ground, is customarily used as a *token* of *reverence*, where *putting off* or *keeping off* the *hat*, there the *choice* of ceremonies must be made with respect to those *particular customes*; Here 'tis evident that I mean not the *frequent usage* of that *ceremony*, in *opposition* to a *first* usage of it, as Mr *F.* is willing to *mistake* me, and found *one* of his arguments on that *mistake*, but the *standing customs* of the place, by which, as by an *argument* or *evidence*, such a *ceremony* is demonstrated to be a *reverential* respect, and so (for the service of *God* to whom all *reverence* is due) *decent* in that place, though in *Nature*, or in the *estimation* of all other men, it be not so.

10. Certainly this is so *evident* in it self, and so undeniably the importance of *my* words, that there can be no need farther to *inlarge* on it, much lesse to *examine* the weight, or meaning of his *concession*, that *it cannot be denyed but that decency doth imply such customes, the omission of which necessarily infers indecency.*]

11. This saying of his some *Readers* may look on with *Reverence*, as not readily comprehending the *importance* of it, others may chance to *despise* it under the appearance of a *tautologie*.

logie. But upon pondering, it will appeare that the *Author* had a *meaning* in it, which he deſigned ſhould bring in ſome *advantage* to his cauſe, and without which he was not likely to *advance* far, or ſucceed in it.

12. Some *cuſtomes* we know there are, which are ſo highly *decent*, as that the *omiſſion* of them *neceſſarily infers indecency*; But what are they? why, ſuch as the *law* of (at leaſt *Lapſt*) *nature* preſcribes, *covering of nakedneſſe*, and the like; of which tis evident among all that have not learnt of *Carneades* induſtriouſly to *raſe* out all *natural* meaſures of *honeſt* and *diſhoneſt*, that the *omiſſion of them inferres indecency*, yea and *neceſſarily* inferres it, this ſort of *decency* being *natural* to all men, that ever were, or ſhall be in the world, born and educated in what *nation*, or *inured* to what *cuſtomes* ſoever, and this the very *firſt* houre after our firſt parents *fall*, before any *cuſtome* had been *contracted* which might *recommend* it to them.

13. And as of theſe his *Rule* is true, that the *omiſſion* of *theſe neceſſarily inferres* undecency, ſo it is in a manner proper to theſe, and belongs not to any other ſort of things, whoſe *decency* flowes but from ſome *poſitive command* though it be of *God*, or *cuſtome* or *command* of *men*. To ſuch things whoſe *decency* flowes from any *command* either of *God* or *man*, this *rule* cannot be *fully* applied, for that *command might* have been *not* given, or there might be a *ſpace* before it was given, or a *people* to whom it was *not* given, and then in *any* of thoſe caſes, the *omiſſion* would not be *indecent* to whom the *law* was *not* given; and ſo it doth not *neceſſarily* and *abſolutely*, but onely *dependently* on that *law*, and *conditionally*, *inferre indecency*; ſo in like manner the *Rule* holds not in thoſe things, whoſe *decency* is introduced onely by *cuſtome*, for that, as *Mr. I.* truely ſaith, *ariſing from frequency of actions*, it muſt again be granted, that there was a *time* when that which now is *cuſtome*, was *new*, and ſo *not cuſtome*, and again there are, or may be *nations*, with whom that *cuſtome* (whatſoever can be inſtanced in) hath not *prevailed*, which *prejudges* all the *neceſſity* ſpoken of, that ſuch *omiſſion* ſhould *inferre indecency*.

14. And ſo we ſee the *ſumme* of *Mr I.* his liberal *confeſſion*, *viz.*: that *decency* implies *naturall decency*, or ſuch *cuſtomes*, which

which are *naturally decent*, and so the *omission* of them *naturally indecent*; and if the *Dr.* or his *party* do not *prove*, or make good, that the *administration* of *baptisme without the crosse*, is against the *law of nature*, that the *preaching without the surplice* beares *analogy* to the *disclosing* of *Nakednesse*, he is utterly *refuted* by *Mr I.* in his interpretation of εὐσχημόνως, or notion of *decency*.

15. That this is indeed his *meaning* (though somewhat *darkned* in that his *expression*) will appear but consequent to the *two* things, which he hath premised in this matter, from *Amesius* his notion of *decency*, p.64. in *Marg*: 1. that *decency requires not that any sacred things be instituted de novo, but onely that those things which are instituted by God, be used in that manner which is agreeable to the dignity of them*, 2. *that as order so decency belongs to civil offices, as well as sacred things, in which indecorum est vitium oppositum debito illi modo, qui requiritur ad eorum justum finem et usum consequendum, indecency is a vice opposed to that due manner, which is required to the obtaining the just end and use of those things*. Now if in the former of these, the *mode*, he speakes of, as *agreeable to the dignity of those things* which are *instituted*, be it self supposed by him to be *instituted* by *men*, then must he acknowledge *humane power* of *instituting ceremonies*, which being so *contrary* to his *design*, I must resolve not to be *intended* by him; but rather that as the *sacred* things are *instituted* by *God*, so the *mode*, which is *consentaneous to their dignity* is *instituted* by *God* also, and that nothing is *decent in sacris*, which is not so *instituted*. And so likewise on the *second head*, that of *civil offices*. For that *indecency*, which is a *vice* or *sin*, must be contrary to some *law* of *Gods*, and so also that which is *opposed to the due manner* which is *required*, and so is *necessary* either *necessitate medii*, or *praecepti* also, to obteining a *just end*, this sure is more than the *omission* of an *indifferent custome*, which may or may not be *continued* without any *offence* against *nature*, even the *omission* of strict *universal* duty, either *natural decency*, or somewhat that beares *proportion* with it.

16. Now this being thus far explained, it is time to close with *Mr I.* and mind him, what he cannot but know, that the *decency* which I said *implied custome*, is certeinly *another* thing from *natural*

tural decency, and hath place onely in those things, the *omitting* of which doth not *necessarily inferre indecency*. That *omission* which *necessarily inferres indecency*, *inferres* it in *all* that ever did, or *shall omit* it; we know in *logick*, that no *proposition* is *necessary*, which is not κατὰ παντὸς, true in the *whole species*, of *all*, and every one, and I leave it to his judgement, whether he think the *Dr.* and his *party* (i.e. *Prelatists*, I suppose,) do conceive, that *Adam* (whether in, or out of *paradise*) *Noah* in, or out of the *Arke*, &c. were obliged to *pray* in *Surplices*, under pain of *indecency*? And so (in his *other* instance) that *John Baptist*, that *Christ*, or (because the *text* saith that he *baptized not but his disciples*) that those *disciples*, even before the *death* of *Christ*, might not *baptize* any without the *sign* of the *Crosse*, but under the same *penalty*?

17. Nay ti's allready past *question*, that *Mr I.* in his *first argument* against my *dictate* (as he calls it) saith, that the *light and law of Nature is also a rule of decency*, and so not *onely custome*: And if so, then *custome* is a *rule of decency also*, and not *onely the Law and light of Nature*, and where *custome*, and not the *light* of *Nature* is the *rule*, there the *omission* of that doth not *necessarily inferre indecency*. And of such *decency* alone it is evident that I spake, on the *head* of *Uniformity*, (and could not speake *sense*, if I spake, either of any *other*, or of the *General notion* of *Decency*, which is competible to any *other*) and from thence it follows demonstratively, that of that *Decency* of which I spake, (though not of that, of which it is *certain* I *spake* not) still *Custome is the onely rule of decency*.

This therefore I hope may serve in *answer* to his *first charge*, that of my *timidity*, *that I dared not say*, what I *said* not; together with a view of his *concession* of the truth of what I did say, and the wary *limitation* of that *concession*.

18. *Secondly* then to his *second charge*, the *unsufficiency* of that *limited* truth (which is the *utmost* he will yield my proposition) *to prove what I would have from it*] It will soon appear of how *little* force it is, when 1. my *meaning* was quite *another* thing from what he affixt to my words, or yielded me in his *limited* concession, as hath already been largely manifested; and 2. my *conclusion is* regularly *consequent* to that which was *alone* my

meaning. This latter the *addition* of a few words will clear alſo.

19. My *concluſion deſigned* in that *Section*, was the juſtifying of *Uniformity* of *ceremonies* in the *ſervice of God*, and one of the grounds to ſupport that, the *decency* of thoſe *ceremonies*, wherein all ſhould joyn, and that *decency ruled*, and judged of by the *cuſtome* of the *place*, in which ſuch or ſuch a *ceremony* was an *uſual* indication, and expreſſion of that *reverence*, which being due from all *inferiours* to their *ſuperiors*, is much more due from all *Chriſtians* to *God*.

20. In theſe it is certain, *cuſtome* is the *rule* and the *onely rule of decency*; Neither *Nature* nor *Gods Law* obliges all mankind to *this*, or *that* expreſſion of *reverence*. Several *Nations* have their *ſeveral* manners of doing it; Onely *Nature* tells us, that the moſt *reverend* manner of treating is beſt becoming *God*, and that it cannot be decent, to treat God in that manner, as we would not do any *ſuperior* beſide, and *Gods* own expoſtulation about the *offering polluted bread upon his altar*, and of *ſacrificing the lame & the ſick*, Mal. 1.8. is a *confirmation* of that, *Offer it now*, ſaith *God*, *unto thy governour, will he be pleaſed with thee?*

21. Apply this to a *particular* caſe, to a *Nation*, where 'tis *cuſtomary* to addreſs to *Kings*, *kneeling*, and there the *Analogie* will hold *exactly*, (but not where that is not *cuſtome*.) Among ſuch I may ſay, Did ever any man that had his *limbs* and *health*, offer a *petition* to his *Prince* in the *geſture* of *ſitting*, or *lying* along upon a *table?* and if he did not, then I muſt, I ſuppoſe, regularly conclude from *cuſtome*, the one *rule* of *decency* in ſuch matters, that according to *Gods* arguing it cannot be *decently* done in *his* ſervice, which is the tendring our *petitions* or *requeſts* to that infinite *Majeſty*. And ſo proportionably in other things.

22. This I did not there apply to the *Croſs in Baptiſme*, and the *Miniſters uſing of the Surplice*, as being not pertinent to that place. *Another head* was ſet apart for thoſe, and proceeded to §. 28. the *Croſs* expreſly named, and the *Surplice* implied under the title of *other ceremonies*, of which it may there be ſeen, what my *concluſion* was, not what is here deem'd *incumbent* on me to *prove*, that the *omiſſion of them infers indecency*,

but

but that ſtanding on thoſe grounds, whereon they are known ſtand, *Conſcience duly inſtructed cannot think it neceſſary or tending to edification to caſt them cauſleſly out of this Church, or the whole Liturgie for their ſakes.*]

23. And yet if Mr J. ſhall now deſire to know what the grounds of thoſe two *Eccleſiaſtical rites* are, which alone he is pleaſed to name, on perſwaſion, I ſuppoſe, that they were as fit, if not fitter then any others, for the *diſproving* my poſition, of [*cuſtom being the onely rule of decency*] I ſhal now render him a *briefe* account of them, ſuch as may in ſome degree *confirm* the truth of it.

24. And *firſt* for the *Croſſe* in *Baptiſme*. 1. 'Tis known to all that our *Chriſtian* courſe is a *ſpiritual warfare* under *Chriſt* our *Great General*; Now it is, and alwayes hath been *cuſtomary* over the world, that in a *Militia* there ſhould be ſome *banner*, or *Inſigne*, to which every one ſhould *reſort* and fight under it. This hath *cuſtome* made *decent* among all, and ſuppoſing that *cuſtome*, the *omiſſion* of it in an *army* is *indecent*, yet not ſo, as things *diſhoneſt*, or breaches of the *Law of Nature*, are *indecent*.

25. And the *Croſſe* on which *Chriſt* was *crucified*, the *Emblem* alſo of that *ſtate* that every *Chriſtian* enters into, a *conſtant* couragious *patience* for all afflictions was by the *primitive Chriſtians* thus uſed, as their (*a*) *ſymbol* or *Inſigne*, and every man that is *inrolled* in the *Chriſtian Militia*, is by him that *inrols* him, ſigned with it; and this practice being thus *founded*, and received in the *Church*, Saint *Auguſtines* words are worth *remembring*, and cannot be denied to have *truth* in them, (*b*) *Signum crucis niſi adhibeatur, ſive frontibus credentium, ſive ipſi aquæ quâ regeneramur &c. nihil ritè perficitur, unleſs the ſign of the croſs be uſed either to the foreheads of the believers* (who are *Baptized*) *or to the water it ſelf by which we are regenerate, it is not duly performed*, i. e. with ſuch *ceremonies*, as by *cuſtome* of the *Church* the *Rule* of *decency*, belong to it; and, *Crucis ſigno in fronte bodie tanquam in poſte ſignandus es, omneſque Chriſtiani ſignantur* (*de Catechiz. rud. c.* 20. *tom.* 4. *pag.* 915.) *thou muſt be ſigned now in the forehead with the ſign of the Croſs, as the Iſraelites on their door-poſts, and ſo muſt all Chriſtians.* In the *fore-*

(a) *Signo crucis actio chriſtiana deſignatur.* Aug. de Doctr. Chr. l. 4.

(b) *In Joh.* Tr. 118.

(c) Tom. 10 P. 289. B. head particularly (c) *in fronte figat ubi ſedes pudoris*) *becauſe the ſeat of ſhame is there*, which we render *in token that the baptized ſhall not be aſhamed*—.

(d) See Aug. de Civ. Dei l. 22. c. 8. 26. *Secondly*, the uſage of this ceremony of *ſigning* with the *Croſs*, was we alſo know, frequent in the *Church* (while the *gifts* of *healing* continued) in (d) *curing diſeaſes*, and *caſting* out *Devils*, ſo that *Athanaſius* frequently affirmes of it, (e) τῷ σημείῳ τοῦ σταυροῦ πάσα μὲν μαγεία παύεται, πᾶσα μὲν φαρμακεία καταργεῖται, καὶ πάλαι μὲν τὰ εἴδωλα ἐρημοῦται, καὶ καταλαμπάνεται, *by the ſign of the croſs all magick and witchcraft is brought to nought, all the Idol Temples laid waſte and empty.*

(e) *De Incarnat. Tom.* 1. *pag.* 84. So *pag.* 101. *D.* Τῷ σημείῳ τοῦ σταυροῦ καὶ μόνον ὁ ἄνθρωπος χρώμενος ἀπελάυνει τούτων τὰς ἀπάτας. And pag. 102. 6. χρησάμενον τῷ σημείῳ τοῦ λεγομένου παρ' ἡμῖν σταυροῦ, καὶ ἔφησαν πῶς δι' αὐτοῦ δαίμονες φεύγουσιν. And *contr. Arian. Or.* 1. *pag.* 285 A. Ὁ τάλας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν μιλώπῃ πεπιεσμένῳ ὑποχέρσιον τετυπτημένῳ καὶ καθηκυιᾷ. And *Preſente ſigno crucis obmutuſcit Paganitas.* Aug. T. 4. 229. B. And 832 B. *Dæmonia nominatâ cruce Chriſti terrentur, ſi impenſius fiat, fugantur. Dii Paganorum motu crucis reſponſa dare non poſſunt.*

27. And then *Baptiſme* being the *exorciſing* of Devils (the *ancient Catechiſts* we know were called *exorciſts*) the reſcuing a perſon from the *power* of *Satan* into *Gods* ſonſhip and *family*, what can be more proper, or agreeable, or exactly *ſymbolical*, then the uſe of this in *Baptiſme*, according to that of *Tertullian*, *de Reſurr. Carn. Caro ſignatur ut anima muniatur*, *the fleſh or body is ſigned, that the ſoul may be defended or fortified.*

(f) *Ad omnem progreſſum frontem crucis ſigniculo terimus.* Tertul. de Cor. Mil. c. 3.

(g) *Vide Narrat. Hippolyti Apoſtolorum συγχρόνου, apud Pallad. Hiſt. Lauſ. pag.* 1049. Ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ σφραγίσασα τῷ μυστηρίῳ τοῦ σταυροῦ ἐξελθοῦσα ἄρθρον.

28. And if inſtead of the (f) *frequent* uſe of it among the *ancients*, even (g) *before* the cumberſome weight of *ceremonies* came in (ἐν τῷ καιρῷ προσευχῆς καταστρώννυμεν τὰς τῆς σφραγῖδος ταύτης διαμοιβάς, ſaith the *Author* of the *Queſt.* and *Reſp.* aſcribed to *Juſtin Martyr*, *Qu.* 91. *pag.* 364. *in time of prayer we ſign thoſe that have any need of it, thoſe that are any way ill affected*) we in this our *Church* retein it onely in our *ſolemne entrance*

entrance into *Christs camp*, in token that we mean *valiantly* to fight under his *banners*, and in *confidence* that he that thus signed to *Constantine* victory from *heaven* (*ἐν τούτῳ νίκα*, *in this overcome*) will thus give *grace*, and *seal* to us *victory* over our *ghostly* enemies. What question can there ever be of the *perfect decency* of this usage among us?

29. And then for the *Surplice*: It is no *news* I hope for *several* sorts of men to have *solemn garments* for *solemn* actions, which they do not use at *other* times. The *Judges* upon the *Bench*, or the *Lords* at their coming to *Parliament*, are a sufficient *evidence* of this, who weare not those *robes* in *common* occasions which there they do, as betokening their *quality* and the *imployments* they are about. And then what is thus *customarie* in *civil* matters (viz: to *difference persons* and *imployments*, yea and *dayes* by distinction of *garments*) and is allowed to be *decent* therein, this by *analogie* undeniable, is as fitly and *decently* from thence derived to *solemne sacred* actions also, such are the *publick offices* of the *Priest*; and the *commands* of our *Superiors* being added to this *decency* of the matter, *τάξις* to *εὐσχήμονος*, it is, I am sure, more than *undecent* for *inferiors* to be *obstinate*, and deny *obedience* to them. In the choice of the *garment* there hath been also, as neare as may be, a *resemblance* observed of those *garments*, which in *Scripture* are mentioned for the like *solemnities*, *long*, *shining*, i.e. *white robes*, or *garments*; And if the *constant* usage of *other Churches* beside this of ours, *Eastern* as well as *Western*, for so many *centuries* together, be considered, it will be competently able to establish an *Ecclesiastical custome* also, which, in things of this nature, were *external ornaments*, and *formalities*, is a more *rational* ground, and *rule* or measure of *decency*, then any Mr *J.* (or *Amesius* to boote) will readily be able to produce for the *rejecting* of them, or *breaking*, and *casting away* those *bands*, which tyed no *harder* a yoke than this upon their *shoulders*.

30. In this case I believe (though not in the *garments* themselves) there is place for that *decency*, the *omission of which necessarily inferres indecency*, and for such *order* the *breaking* of which must soon end in *ἀκαταστασία* (which *Mr I.* saith, *St. Paul* opposes to *τάξις*) *viz.*: down right *confusion*.

Having

31. Having ſa'd thus much *ex abundanti*, above what was *incumbent* on me, I ſhall flatter my ſelf, that I may now ſpare any *larger* paines, in ſurvey of *Ameſius's arguments*, which Mr *J.* is reſolved to think *conſiderable*, and to ſpeake very *magnificently* of them, as *proving* that the *text* is 1 *Cor.* xiv. 40. *rightly underſtood doth not onely not authorize any humane inſtitution of ceremonies, but on the contrary plainly condemnes them, and this*, ſaith he, *was ſo well managed by him, that he hath quite beaten out of the field Biſhop Morton and his ſecond*, Dr *J. Burges*:

32. Here is *triumph* indeed. And I ſuppoſe the *Reader* already diſcernes, what are the *grounds* of it, *viz.* that *Ameſius* acknowledges nothing *decent*, but that, the *omiſſion of which neceſſarily inferres indecency*, i.e. as hath been ſhewed, nothing but *natural decency*, the *omiſſion* of which is a *vice contrary to that*, by conſequence, that there is no ſuch thing, as an *indifferent geſture* or *garment*, which either *civil*, or *Eccleſiaſtical cuſtome*, or *obedience* to our *lawfull ſuperiors* may render *decent*; that whatſoever ſome *eternal Law* of *Nature* commands not, the doing of that, if it be but wearing ſuch a *garment*, which the *Canons* of any *Church* preſcribe, nay, by *parity* of reaſon, a *cloake* or a *buttond doublet*, is abſolutely *unlawfull* by force of 1 *Cor.* xiv. 40:

33. This being the *bottome* of thoſe *arguments* of *Ameſius*, I may ſafely tell Mr *J.* that they could no otherwiſe beat either *Biſhop Morton*, or Dr *J. Burgeſſe out of the field*, than that they thought them utterly *unworthy* their making *replies* to; He that thinkes there is nothing *indifferent*, nothing *lawfull*, the *omiſſion* of which is not *ſin*, doth certainly uſe other *dictionaries* than we do; diſcernes no *difference* betwixt *lawfull*, and *neceſſary*, and as the *Aſſertors* of *Fatall production* of all things will not allow a *cauſe* to be *ſufficient* to produce any effect which it doth not *produce*, and ſo *produce*, that it *cannot* not *produce* it, which is to tell me that I *ſit*, and *walke* at the very time, when I *ſtand* ſtill, it being certain, that I am *equally able* to do both thoſe, when yet I *really* do the *third* onely, ſo he will not allow any thing *morally poſſible*, which is not *morally neceſſary*, which is certainly the giving *new lawes* to words (making the word [*lawfull* or *poſſible*] which was wont to be *interpreted* that

that which *may* or *may not* be done, to signifie onely, that which *must* be done, and may not be *emitted*) and not *new* reasons to confirme *old paradoxes*.

34. This *argument* of *Amesius* against things *indifferent*, that *learned Bishop* was well acquainted with, by his familiar conferences with Mr. *Lapthorne*, a vehement *disputer* against *ceremonies*, and whom the *Bishop* thought fitter to refute by *trifling* instances, of *unbuttoning*, and *buttoning* his *cassock*; than by more *serious* attempts of *conviction*, i.e. in plain termes to *despise* and *smile* at, than to *dread*; and if Mr *J.* have really read Mr *Hooker*, whom he somwhere intitles our *Patrone of ceremonies*, he may in him remember a discourse of *lawes*, which will supersede all *necessity*, or benefit of my *farther* inlarging on it.

Mr Hynde, & Mr Glapthorne two vehement disputers.

35. Meane while, to the *reproch* of my great *stupidity*, I willingly acknowledge, that it cannot enter into my *understanding*, what sense that *text* is capable of, which with the best (possible) *managery* can be taught *plainly to condemne all institution of ceremonies in the Church*, i.e. by what *prosyllogismes*, or *supplies* or *advantages* of art this *Enthymeme* shall be rendred *concludent*. *The Apostle commands that all things be done decently and in order. Ergo, He condemnes all institution of Ceremonies for Gods worship*. He that can maintain this *consequence* not onely to be *true*, but (as Mr *J.* affirmes of him) *plain* and *evident*, will be a *formidable adversarie* indeed, much better deserving that *title*, than one whom he knowes not, and therefore honours with it.

36. His *third* and *last* impression now remaines, wherein he undertakes to prove by 3. *arguments* that *custome is not the onely rule of decency*; and his *first argument* is, *because the light and law of nature is also a rule of decency*. To this I *answer*, that in those things, whereof *alone* he knowes I there speak, in the §. concerning *Uniformity*, i.e. in things *indifferent*, *gestures* and other *ceremonies* in *Gods* service, the *Law of Nature* is no *rule* at all, and, I suppose, he cannot think, I am sure, he pretends not to *prove*, or so much as *affirme*, it is, and therefore though not *simply* in *all* sorts of things, of which I spake not, nor can by any *rules* of *discourse* be supposed to have spoken, yet as to the matters then before me, wherein *Ecclesiastick Conformity* con-

consisted, *custome* and onely *custome* was the *rule* of *Decency*.

37. His *second argument* is wholly deceitfull, and must be discovered to be so by reducing it to *rules* of *art*. 'Tis by him variously formed into *two* several *Syllogismes*. The *first* is this.

Nothing can be undecent, which is agreeable to the onely rule of Decency.

But divers things are undecent, which yet can plead custome. The conclusion now must be, Therefore custome is not the onely rule of decency.

38. But this is no *regular Syllogisme*, 'tis in no *mood* or *figure*, nor readily *reducible* to any, and therefore twas his onely way to *presume* it *evident*, and never to *endeavour* any *proof* thereof.

39. But he hath thought fit to *vary* this *syllogisme*, and give it in *other* termes, and then one might hope it would be *exactly* form'd. 'Tis thus,

It is impossible that the onely rule of decency should be undecent.

But yet it is very possible that many customes should be undecent.

Therefore he shall conclude that custome is not the onely rule of decency.

40. But this is no *syllogisme* neither, being far removed from the *measure* that *Logicians* exact, and such as by which I will prove any thing *true*, that is the most distant from it. For *example*, it is a granted truth, that *Law* is the *onely rule of Justice*, yet this I shall disprove by a *syllogisme* exactly formed by Mr *J.* his *model*, Thus,

It is impossible that the onely rule of justice should be unjust.

But yet it is very possible that many Laws should be unjust.

Therefore I shall conclude that Law is not the onely rule of justice.

41. To discover this *deceit* then, the *syllogisme* which is now no *syllogisme* must be somewhat better form'd, according to the rules of *Logick*, and reduced, as near as it can, into a *true syllogisme*. Thus,

Whatsoever is it self undecent, cannot be the onely rule of decency.

But custome is it self undecent.

Therefore custome cannot be the onely rule of decency.

Here

Here before it can be defin'd whether this be a *regular Syllogism*, or no, it muſt be demanded, *quanta eſt minor*, is the *aſſumption Univerſal* or *particular*? If it be *particular*, then either the concluſion muſt be particular alſo, or elſe 'tis a *falſe Syllogiſm*. And if the *concluſion* be *particular*, then it infers no more then that *ſome undecent cuſtome cannot be the only rule of decency*, which is willingly granted by me, who do not at all affirm it of *undecent cuſtomes*; But if the *minor* be *Univerſal*, then 'tis a *falſe propoſition*, for certainly *all cuſtomes* are not *indecent*. The ſhort is, *Nature* may be the *rule* of one ſort of *decency*, & *cuſtom* the only *rule* of *another*; yet if the *cuſtom* be in it ſelf *indecent*, then of ſuch *indecent cuſtom* it is not pretended, that it is either *only*, or *at all* the *rule of decency*. And ſo ſtill my *propoſition* may ſtand good, which as it belonged not to *natural decency*, ſo much leſs to what is by *Nature*, or in it ſelf *undecent*, never imagining it reaſonable, that what *geſtures* were againſt thoſe *Laws* of *Nature*, or *Scripture*, or any other *Law* of *decency*, or rather of *natural comlineſs* and *honeſty*, ſhould by pretence of any *cuſtome* whatever, be introduced into *Gods worſhip*; 'Tis ſufficient that *ſome cuſtomes* may be *decent*, or in themſelves not *indecent*, and that all *decency* in the *ſervice* of *God*, is to be *regulated* and judged of by *conformity* with them: For I ſaid not that *all cuſtomes* were the *rule* of *decency*, but that *ſome were*, and that there was no *other* rule, but *cuſtome*. This, I hope, hath diſcovered the *invalidity* of his ſecond *argument*.

42. His *laſt argument* [*becauſe there is decency in the firſt uſage of ſome things*] falls upon that *miſtake* of my words, which I diſcourſed of, and *cleared* at the *beginning*, for I never ſaid, that a thing muſt be *cuſtomary*, before it is *decent* in any kind, (knowing unqueſtionably that there is a *natural decency*) but that the *decency* of any *ceremony* in *Gods ſervice*, wherein *God* and *Nature* have *preſcribed nothing* particularly, muſt be regulated according to thoſe *meaſures*, which the *cuſtomes* of any place do allow to be *reverential* among them; Or, in yet plainer words, the *civil cuſtomes* of any *Nation*, by which this or that ſort of *geſture* is rendred a token of *reverence*, are the *onely rule*, by which the *decency* of *indifferent geſtures*, &c. is to be judged of, in order to *God's ſervice*. And ſo much for the *laſt argument*

also, and consequently for the *first* part of his *exception*, that against my *interpretation* of εὐχημόνως *decently*.

43. But there is yet a *second charge* behind against my rendring of κατὰ τάξιν, *according to appointment*] which he hath managed in these words.

44. *As for the other part of the words, let all things be done in order,* Ames *in the place forementioned sheweth that order requireth not such ceremonies as ours, and he giveth this reason, because order requireth not the institution of any new thing but onely the right placing and disposing of things which are formerly instituted: and this he makes good from the notation of the word, from the definitions of order, which are given by Philosophers and Divines &c. from the context of the chapter, and from the usage of the word elsewhere. But the Doctor, that the words may give some countenance unto our ceremonies, adventureth upon a new interpretation of them.*

The words κατὰ τάξιν *(saith he,) literally import according unto appointment,* τάττειν *sometimes signifies to appoint, as Mat.28.16. Act.22.10. and 28.23. And we may hereupon argue à conjugatis, that* τάξις *may be sometimes rendred appointment. But because it may sometimes be rendred appointment, will it therefore follow that it must be so rendred in this place?*

We may say *as well as the* Dr. *that the words* κατὰ τάξιν *literally import according unto order, as order is taken strictly for the right placing or ranking of things one before, another after, and this we have confessed even by* Dr John Burgesse *in his rejoynder unto* Ames p.78. *a book published by the special command of the late King. Moreover this sense is favoured by the coherence, for.v.31. we have a particular instance of order in this acception of the word, ye may all prophesie one by one &c. and not all or many speake at once 2. We have the opposite of order taken in this sense.1.v.33. confusion. Let all things be done in order, then is as much as, let all things be done without confusion. And I hope confusion may be avoided in the worship of God without such ceremonies as ours.*

But we will for once suppose, though not grant, that the clear importance of the words, is, that all be done in the Church according to customs and appointment. Yet the Dr *hath a hard taske to perform, before he can come nigh his conclusion, that the words of*

of Paul are a proofe of the more than lawfulnesse of prescription of such ceremonies as were in a Church: For he must prove that custome and order here are taken in such a latitude, as that they include not onely the customes and appointments of the Apostolical Churches, but also of all the Churches of God in succeeding ages: and the performance of this he will find not to be so easie, as he may imagine.

I am sensible that I have by this discourse provoked a very learned and formidable adversary, but it is onely love of the truth hath ingaged me in so unequal an encounter, and therefore I hope the Dr will pardon and excuse my boldnesse. If he can by dint of argument prove the truth to be on his side, I shall not be sorry or ashamed to be overcome by him.

45. To this my *answer* will be very *briefe*, 1. by giving the *reason* of my *rendring*, 2. by evidencing, that if the *vulgar* were acknowledged the righter rendring, yet my *conclusion* would very regularly follow thence, and that therefore I have no need to *contend* with any gainsayer, about my *rendring*.

46. For the *first*, it is manifest to any that knowes but the *elements* of *Greeke*, that κατὰ τάξιν *literally* and *properly* signifies [*according to ordination or appointment*] κατὰ signifies [*according to*] not [*in*] and τάξις or διάταξις [*an ordinance or constitution*] millions of times in authors, and εὐτάκτως *orderly*, or *in order*] lying more consonant with ἐυκοσμίως, no reason can be rendred, why if that had been the *designed* meaning, that word should not have been used there.

47. That it may so signifie Mr *J.* acknowledges, and so I have obtained all I seek in my *first* proposal, which was not, that it *must* necessarily thus signifie, but that this being the *literal* regular rendring of it, I had sufficient *reason* to render it thus.

48. I proceed then to the *second* thing, that if what he pretends to be *possible* also, were indeed the *onely possible*, or (by way of *supposition*, but not *concession*) if κατὰ τάξιν] did really import no more than [*in order*] as that is opposed to *disorder* or *confusion*, yet I say, it will soon appear, that the *Apostles* commanding such *order* or *orderlynesse*, and *forbidding* all *confusion* in *ecclesiastical* affaires, must by consequence be interpreted to *command* the *instituting* and *observing* *uniformity* of *ceremonies* in a *Church*. This I thus deduce.

49. *First* there is no possibility of *worshipping God externally* and *publickly*, without use of some *ceremonies* or *circumstances* of *time*, *place*, and *gesture*, &c. Secondly there is no possibility of *order* in a *multitude*, without *uniformity* in the same *circumstances*, Thirdly, there *is* as little *possibility* of *Uniformity* among many, without either *agreement* one with another, or *direction* of some *superior* to them all, what shall by all be *uniformely* performed. Fourthly the *agreement* one with another, if it be onely *voluntarie*, and such, as by which none are *obliged*, no way *secures* the *end*; but if it be such an *agreement*, that every single person is *obliged* to observe, then still is that a *law* of that *body*, as of a *Councel*, &c. and as truely so, as the *constitution* of a *single Prelate* can be thought to be. And so the *conclusion* regularly followes, that to the *preserving* but of *order*, or *orderlynesse* in a *Church*, it is necessary, there be *appointment*, what shall by all be *uniformely* performed; *confusion* unavoidably coming in, where no certain rules are prescribed for *Uniformity*.

50. What can be *denyed* in this processe, I foresee not, yet when ti's granted, one reserve Mr *J.* hath still left him. For saith he, *if it were granted that* τάξις *signifies appointment or ordination, yet still it will be incumbent on the* Dr. *to prove, that this extends not onely to the customes and appointments of the Apostolike Churches, but also to the Churches of succeeding ages.* And my *answer* to this will *conclude* this whole debate.

51. *First* then I acknowledge, that it is not here *necessarily* ordained by the *Apostle*, that *all* the *Churches* of *God* in *succeeding* ages should *institute* ceremonies in *worship*, for provided those *ceremonies* were once *instituted*, all that this *text* inforces, is *uniforme obedience* to them.

52. But then secondly, when for many *circumstances* of *Gods worship*, there is no *order* particularly taken by *Christ* and his *Apostles*, as in what *gesture publick supplication* shall be addrest, in what, *lauds* and *hymnes*, and *confession* of the *faith*, &c. and yet the *rule* is given by them, that *all* shall be *done according to appointment*, and moreover in other places that *obedience* be paid to *those superiors* which *watch over our souls*; and when those *rules* are not given onely to the *persons* that then lived in the *Church* of *Corinth*, &c. but to all that should ever *live* in.

in that, and *all* other *Churches*, it cannot then be deemed, either that there were no *superiors* designed to *succeed Christ*, and his *Apostles* in the ordering of his *Church*, or that they should not ἐπιδιορθοῦν τὰ λείποντα *set in order the things that were wanting*, such as the *Apostles* had left undisposed of, or that *inferiors* shou'd not be bound to *obey* them *uniformly* when they thus gave *orders* to them.

§3. When we are *commanded* to *obey our parents*, *civil* as well as *natural*, by a *law* given by *God* to *Moses*, or by *Christ* to his *disciples*, can it be strange, that we that lived not in either of *those* ages, should thereby be *obliged*, when *God* in his providence hath given us *fathers* of *both* kinds (as well as them) regularly *presiding* over us, and making use of that *liberty* that is presumed in all *parents*, *viz.*: to give *commands*, and expect *obedience* from their *children*? Certainly it cannot, and as little can it be doubted, either whether our *ecclesiastical parents* have power to *institute* in things *omitted*, and thereby *remitted* to their care by the *Apostles*, or whether we their *obedient children*, that are *commanded* to act κατὰ τάξιν *according to appointment*, should from time to time be disobliged, and *free* to *disobey* them in whatsoever they *appoint* us.

§4. Tis *granted* him, if he please, that what *Christ*, and his *Apostles* have already *prescribed*, should not be *repealed* by those that thus *succeed* them; should they rashly assume that *power*, they would not in so doing act κατὰ τάξιν, whether *regularly* or *according to appointment*; but for the τὰ λείποντα in which they have made no *rules*, but left *order* to *Titus*, &c. (i.e. by *parity* of reason, to the *Bishops* in every *Island*) to make them; here what *power* is *left* them, may certainly with perfect *safety* be *exercised* by them. and that *necessarily infurres* our *obligation* to yield *obedience* to their *exercises* of them.

§5. This is all the observance Mr *J.* seemes to expect of me at this time, unlesse his *intimation* to *all admirers of* Mr. *Hooker*, that they should *vindicate their great Patrone of Ceremonies*, may passe for an *admonition* to me, who acknowledge my self a thankfull *adorer* of *Gods graces* in that *Godly learned* man, and so exact a few lines more above the *regular* account. p. 144.

This

56. This will detain me no longer than whileſt I mind the *Reader* that in a diſcourſe of the *benefits* which we receive from *Chriſt* in the *Sacrament, and otherwiſe*, Mr *Hooker* undertakes to ſet down how *Chriſt* in his *human nature* is *communicated* to us, and ſo *preſent with us*; To this end 3. things he ſhewes at large, 1. that as *nothing created can be undivided, or receive any ſuch accident from any as may really make it infinite, ſo neither the ſoul nor body of Chriſt, nor Chriſt as man, nor according to his humane nature, can poſſibly be every where preſent, no nor the ſubſtance of the body of Chriſt, which neither hath nor can have any preſence but onely local.* 2. That *this cannot be rendred poſſible either by the grace of union with Deity, nor by any other poſſible means, as he at large excellently deduceth it*, pag. 300, 301, 302. 3. That *it may peradventure be well enough granted in ſome ſenſe, and after a ſort, that Chriſt is every where preſent, as man*, viz. 1. *in reſpect of the conjunction of the humane nature with the Deity, which conjunction is extended as far as the Deity, the actual poſition being reſtrain'd and tied to a certain place, and* 2. *by cooperation with Deity, and that in all things.* Eccl. Pol. l. 5. Sect. 55.

57. Now on this *third* head, (without reflecting on the *two* former, which aſſure us of the *authors* meaning in it) *two* paſſages Mr ? takes hold of, which, if *he know any thing in either philoſophy or ſcholaſtical divinity, are both guilty of a groſs miſtake, and cannot be ſufficiently wondred at by him, that they ſhould fall from ſo learned a pen.* P. 139. P. 140.

58. But I ſuppoſe there is no great skill in *either* of thoſe *learned* faculties, required, to *diſtinguiſh* betwixt that which *truly* and *properly* is, and that which *may in ſome ſenſe, and after a ſort*, and *in two reſpects onely* (neither of which belong to the *propriety* of being) be *well enough granted*, and that with a [*peradventure*] alſo, to have *influence* on all theſe.

59. And what *ſeverity* is this, to require of every *learned* man, that hath moſt largely *refuted* an *adverſary*, to be ſo *averſe* from all thoughts of *peace* and *reconcilation* with him, that he may not allow him to ſpeak *truth*, or but *perhaps* to ſpeak truth *in a ſort*, and in *ſome ſenſe*, and in *two onely reſpects*? all which are ſtill more than *intimations*, that he thinks him to be *abſolute-*

ly

ly (and its *simplicity* and *propriety* of ſpeaking) in a *groſs error*, impoſſible even to the *power* of *God* to have truth in it.

60. If any ſhould chance to ſay of an *eloquent* man, that you might *hear an Angel ſpeak in him*, and I ſhould reply, that it might *peradventure be well enough granted in a ſort*, *or in ſome ſenſe*, that when he ſpake you might *hear an Angel*, aſſuring you at large of my *opinion*, that no bare *man* can truly be an *Angel*, nay that it was impoſſible for *God* himſelf to bring to paſs, that at the *ſame* time he ſhould be an *Angel*, and not an *Angel*, a *man*, and not a *man*, or which is all one, a *bare* man, and yet an *Angel*, or (in *fewer* words) when *Chriſt* ſaith he is a *door*, and a *vine*, if I ſhould ſay, that *in a ſort* and in *ſome ſenſe*, and that in *two reſpects*, each of theſe had *truth* in them, would Mr *J.* think fit to leave his ſubject, and let looſe for *three* leaves together, and *pawn* all his *Philoſophy* and *ſcholaſtical* (not conſidering what the conſequence alſo may be to his *practical*) *divinity*, to *accuſe* and *wonder* at, and never to *give over wondering*, and withall ſolemnly to *refute* this or that *improper figurative* ſpeech, ſo perfectly acknowledged by the *ſpeakers to be* ſuch?

61. If he have that *great* leiſure, and any *prevalent temptation* thus to lay it out, I ſhall onely aſſure him, that I have not ſo much of *either*, as to *attend* theſe his *motions*, not any other *lover* or *admirer of Mr Hooker*, that I know of, and therefore beſeech him *contentedly* to reſt in this *general* return to his charge of that *learned* man, without expecting any more *explicite* or *particular ſurvey* of it. And ſo much for Mr *H.* alſo.

62. I have thus without any other *obligation*, than what my deſire to undeceive the *Author* and his *Readers*, laid upon me, paid him now this my *ſecond obſervance*; And may be allowed to think it *time*, that he who hath been ſo liberal of his *uſes* of publick *refutation* of *others words*, ſhould find ſome *vacancy* for one *uſe* of more private (if not *reprehenſion*, yet) *examination* of his *own actions*; And then I ſhall offer to his conſideration, how much more agreeable to the *laws of brotherly kindneſſe* or *candor* it had been, to have propoſed his *exceptions* in ſuch a manner of *friendly addreſs*, as might have brought him home the ſame *ſatisfaction*,

tisfaction, and saved others the *importunity* of these *uselesse*, because *personal* debates. When he hath sincerely observed in himself the *motive* of his other *distant choice*, I have obtained the *end* of my *charity* in mentioning it to him, and have no more to *return* to him at this *time*.

THE END.

Errata *in the first Reply to* Mr Jeanes.

Pag. 1. l. 2. dele *to*. p. 3. l. 4. r. *change*. l. 28. r. *another*, *sec. magis*. p. 6. l. 11. r. *is in that*. p. 10. l. 30. r. ὅπερ.

Errata *in the second Reply to* Mr Jeanes.

Pag. 11. l. 1. r. *known to stand*. p. 13. l. 28. r. *meer external*. p. 15. l. 6. r. Mr *Hynde*, *and* Mr *Glasthorne two vehement disputers*. p. 16. l. 23. r. *measures*.

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